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I. INTRODUCTION: WHY THE GREAT LAKES STATES AND
PROVINCES FEAR TRANSBASIN DIVERSIONS
Compared to many of the world's contested international
watersheds such as the Amu Darya in Central Asia, the
Colorado River, or the Nile Basin, the Canadian-United States
Great Lakes Basin is a paradox: the level of controversy about
the management and use of the waters is inverse to the amount
of water in the basin. The lakes themselves contain twenty
percent of the world's fresh water.' However, comparatively
* Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, A.B., 1962, LL.B., 1965 Stanford
University. The author wishes to disclose that between 1999 and 2002, he was a
consultant to the International Joint Commission (IJC) on Great Lakes diversion
issues and assisted in two of the Commission reports cited in this article. Prior to
that time, he occasionally consulted with the Council of Great Lakes Governors on
the principles of water law relevant to the regulation of diversions. However, the
views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect those
of the IJC, the governments of Canada and the United States, or the Council of
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little of this water is currently withdrawn, and only about five
percent of that amount is consumed and not returned to the
watershed. 2 In 2002, the International Joint Commission (IJC),
the Canadian-United States body which administers the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty, revised its previous consumptive use
estimates downward by eighteen percent. 3 Out-of-basin diver-
sions are even smaller.4 The major transbasin diversion is the
Chicago diversion. Chicago and its lakeshore suburbs are
authorized by a United States Supreme Court decree to with-
draw 3,200 cubic feet per second from Lake Michigan.5 Only the
fact that the Mississippi watershed encompasses most of the
metropolitan Chicago area makes this a transbasin diversion.
The other major transwatershed diversion, the Long Lake and
Ogoki diversions, actually add water to Lake Superior. 6
However, despite the modest levels of present and projected
consumptive use and the vast amount of water in the lakes,
fears about future in-basin consumptive uses and transbasin
diversions have been a major political and legal issue in the
basin for more than two decades.
In the 1980s, proposals to supply a coal slurry pipeline in
Wyoming with Lake Superior water and to bail out the Ogallala
aquifer in the Great Plains created intense opposition within the
eight Great Lakes states, 7 the two Canadian provinces of
Ontario and Quebec, and on the part of the Canadian federal
government. At the same time these proposals were being
floated, dreamers in Canada unveiled a plan to divert the
Great Lakes Governors. Preliminary versions of this article were presented at a
workshop, Legal Diversions or Legal Solutions: The Draft Annex 2001 Agreements,
jointly sponsored by the Chicago-Kent College of Law and the Munk Centre for
International Studies at Trinity College, University of Toronto, held in Chicago on
February 17, 2005 and at a similar July 29, 2005 Munk Centre-Michigan State
University workshop held in Toronto, Ontario.
1. The Water Cycle: Freshwater Storage, http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/
watercyclefreshstorage.html (last visited Sept 23, 2005).
2. International Joint Commission, Protection of the Waters of the Great
Lakes: Final Report to the Governments of Canada and the United States (2000),
available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publicationsfhtml/finalreport.html [hereinafter
Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes].
3. International Joint Commission, Protection of the Waters of the Great
Lakes: Three Year Review, 4 (Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Three Year Review].
4. Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, supra note 2.
5. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426, 427 (1967), amended by Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980).
6. Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, supra note 2.
7. Peter V. MacAvoy, The Great Lakes Charter: Toward a Basinwide Strategy
for Managing the Great Lakes, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 49, 53-54 (1986).
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waters of James Bay in the Hudson Bay drainage, which was
being developed for large-scale hydroelectric production, into the
Great Lakes for ultimate use in the arid areas of the two
countries.8 The response to these highly speculative diversion
proposals was the creation of a binational soft law regime, ulti-
mately backed by federal law in both countries, which makes it
extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible, for any public or
private party to divert water out of the Great Lakes Basin or
even into a Great Lakes province or state that lies outside the
basin.9
The soft law regime is the 1985 Great Lakes Charter signed
by the eight Great Lakes states and the provinces of Ontario
and Quebec. 10 Principle IV requires that a signatory state or
province notify, consult, and seek the consent of the other signa-
tories before approving any new or increased diversion or
consumptive use "of the water resources of the Great Lakes"
more than 5,000,000 gallons over a thirty-day average.11 The
charter was further implemented by the adoption of state laws
that prohibit out-of-basin diversions. 12 The charter and the
anti-diversion laws apply both to interstate and intrastate
transbasin diversions. In 198613 and again in 2000,14 the
United States Congress passed legislation which allows the
governor of any Great Lakes state to veto a transbasin
diversion. In 2001, Canada amended the International
Boundary Waters Act to prohibit all diversions outside of
boundary waters' basins, which includes the Great Lakes. 15
8. Michael J. Donahue, Alicia A. Bixby, & David Siebert, Great Lakes
Diversion and Consumptive Use: The Issue in Perspective, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 19, 40-42 (1986).
9. As the map of the Basin illustrates, there is no correspondence between
hydrological and political boundaries. To further complicate matters, the surface
and groundwater divides can also be different due to uncontrolled groundwater
pumping. See N.G. Grannemann, R.J. Hunt, J.R. Nicholas, T.E. Reilly & T.C.
Winter, THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUND WATER IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, U.S.
Geological Survey Water-Resources Investigations Report 00-4008 8 (2000).
10. The Great Lakes Charter: Principles for the Management of Great Lakes
Water Resources, Feb. 11, 1985, available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/
water/docs/GreatLakesCharter.pdf.
11. Id. at2, 4.
12. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. 324.32703; See also infra notes 60-63 (providing a
discussion of the Dormant Commerce Clause (more accurately Supreme Court
doctrine) issues that these statutes raise and Congress's power to waive the
Supreme Court doctrine).
13. The Omnibus Water Resources Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(d) (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(d), as amended (2000).
15. An Act to amend the International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, 2001 S.C.,
2006]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
After its passage in 1986, the Congressional legislation and
the charter were applied in the gubernatorial review of several
relatively small diversion proposals in the United States. The
charter was also raised in litigation but no interpretative judg-
ments were rendered.16 A Wisconsin diversion was approved in
1989.17 Michigan, however, vetoed a plan to augment the
supply of the small Indiana community of Lowell, located just
outside the basin.'8 In the drought summer of 1988, Canada
strenuously objected to an Illinois request that the United
States Army Corps of Engineers increase the Chicago diversion
to relieve barges stranded along the Illinois River, and the
request was in fact denied.19 The jurisdiction of the charter and
the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (WRDA) were
raised in objections to the Crandon Mine proposal in northern
Wisconsin. The company planned to divert ground water from
the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River drainage, and NGOs
argued that this triggered WRDA. However, the United States
Army Corps of Engineers ruled that the groundwater was not
within WRDA.20 These actions, while relatively minor,
ultimately shaped the ongoing dialogue about standards that
should apply to the use of Great Lakes waters. For example, in
his 1992 veto of the proposed Lowell, Indiana diversion,
Governor Engler suggested that diversions might be allowed if
no imminent adverse health, safety, and welfare risks were
demonstrated, there was meaningful conservation, and clean
water was returned to the lakes after use. 21
This soft law regime has effectively taken large-scale diver-
sions off the political agenda, but it has not eased fears of raids
on the lakes.22 Fears also exist regarding the cumulative impact
ch.40 (Can.).
16. See James P. Hill, The New Politics of Great Lakes Water Diversion: A
Canada-Michigan Interface, TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L. Sci. & POLY 75, 80 (1999).
17. Id. at 81.
18. Id. at 83.
19. Id. at 80.
20. Id. at 84.
21. See id. at 83.
22. The Great Lakes states will lose more than a dozen members of Congress
by 2025, triggering fears that the arid states may push for federal authorization of
large-scale interbasin transfers. See Peter Luke, Great Lakes States Circle the
Wagons on Fresh Water, BOOTH NEWSPAPERS, July 10, 2005, available at
http://www.greatlakesdirectory.org/mi/071105-great-lakes.htm. The Transportation
Research Board estimates that the 2000-2025 population growth rates will be 13.5
percent in the Midwest versus 27.2 and 33.4 percent in the South and West
respectively. TRANSP. RES. BD., NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, COSTS OF SPRAWL-2000, at
67 (2002).
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of small diversions, especially for cities that straddle the divide
between the Great Lakes and other basins such as the
Mississippi or the Ohio. Raid fears resurfaced after a 1998
proposal to ship bulk water drawn from the lakes to Asia.23 The
media and political reaction triggered a new round of concern in
Canada, 24 and to a lesser extent in the United States, and
ultimately led to efforts to harden the existing soft law regime.
The current effort is fueled both by these highly speculative
fears and two resulting major legal developments. First, in
1999, the Council of Great Lakes Governors pledged to
reinvigorate the charter.25 The council commissioned a legal
opinion by a western water law lawyer. The opinion concluded
that the U.S. federal statute which supported the soft antidi-
version regime was unconstitutional and that the states and
provinces should negotiate a binational state-provincial
allocation and management compact. 26 Second, contrary to the
conclusions of almost all trade experts,27 influential Canadian
nationalist-greens asserted that the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
potentially strip Canada and the United States of their
sovereign authority to manage their waters. The argument is
that Canadian water is at risk of flowing to the wasteful United
States and other arid countries because it is a good.28
Canadians follow carefully the efforts of the arid West to
squeeze more water for urban growth out of its variable water
resources.
29
Opposing Great Lakes diversions makes good politics both
in the eight basin states and in Canada. Thus, it is not
surprising that new antidiversion initiatives would follow.
Starting in 2001, the basin states, the two Canadian basin
provinces, and the federal governments of Canada and the
United States have been trying to develop an effective
23. See Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, supra note 2.
24. See id.
25. Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes Water Management
Initiative (Oct. 15, 1999), http://www.cglg.orgtprojects/water/statement.asp.
26. JAMES S. LOCKHEAD ET AL., REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES
GOVERNORS: GOVERNING WITHDRAWALS OF WATER FROM THE GREAT LAKES (1999).
27. See Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, supra note 2.
28. See A. DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR. & DAVID H. GETCHES,
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 1017-18
(5th ed. 2002).
29. A strong antidiversion policy is one of the key issues for Canadian
nationalists. See, e.g., MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD: THE FIGHT TO
STOP THE CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD'S WATER (New Press 2002).
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binational regulatory regime for the lakes despite the fact that a
functioning regulatory regime already exists-the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty,30 administered by the IJC. The IJC
has played a constructive role in the debate, but the states and
provinces have decided to create a new regime which will be
administered by the states and provinces rather than the IJC.
Through the binational process, or Annex 2001, the states,
provinces, and two federal governments have reached a
consensus that the lakes should be conserved by maintaining
their natural fluctuating levels and by minimizing large and
small diversions.31 However, this consensus has neither trans-
lated into a new regional and state or provincial hard law
allocation and management regime for the lakes nor into a
consensus about the desired regime. Significant differences
exist among the stakeholders about the degree of ecological and
political risk of diversions and thus about the extent to which
they should be permitted. There are many reasons for these
differences, but at base the major public and nongovernmental
stakeholders still have substantially different views on the uses
of the lakes. The debates over technical issues such as the stan-
dards for different types of diversions reveal a fundamental
division about the way the resources of the lakes should be
categorized.
The Annex 2001 process is difficult because it initially
contemplated the creation of a binding international agreement
among the second level governmental units (provinces and
states) of two fundamentally different federal systems. A great
deal of subfederal unit cooperation exists in practice but it does
so in an ill-defined international law regime. International law
remains focused on nation-to-nation relations or the universal
human rights of individuals rather than on more arcane
questions such as cross-border subfederal unit relations. What
law exists suggests that it may be easier under U.S. constitu-
tional law for the states to enter into a binding compact with
Ontario and Quebec than it would be for the provinces to do so
30. Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Britain, Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat.
2448 [hereinafter, the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty].
31. See Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, supra note 2. The Report
recommended, inter alia, that no transbasin diversion be authorized "unless the
proponent can demonstrate that the removal will not endanger the integrity of the
Great Lakes Basin" and no new or increased major consumptive uses be allowed to
proceed unless full consideration was given to the potential cumulative impacts and
conservation alternatives.
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under Canadian constitutional law. The United States has
traditionally been viewed as having a strong federal government
and Canada a weak one, but Canada has asserted a very strong
federal interest in Great Lakes diversions. In contrast, the
United States appears far more willing to let the states decide
the level of diversions.3 2
During the diversion debates, at least five different views of
the lakes have emerged. This paper sets out the five possible
views and their first order consequences based on the societal
values that they represent and opines why the adoption of a
particular view might make a difference to the debate about the
appropriate management and regulatory regime for use of the
lakes' waters. The views try to capture the perspectives of the
major stakeholders, states, provinces, Indian tribes, Canadian
First Nations, and user and environmental NGOs. At base, the
views reflect potentially divergent views about how the lakes
should be managed and used and thus the value of alternative
use and management scenarios to the basin's economy and
future. These views have emerged over the past two decades,
although they have seldom been articulated as distinct with
potentially different consequences. Many of the views share
common elements but there are equally important differences.
This essay argues that an explicit recognition of the different
views will help clarify the debate about the appropriate manage-
ment regime. It also argues that it is necessary to appreciate
the differences between the federal regimes in Canada and the
United States in order to understand what type of binational
regime is possible.
II. FIVE POSSIBLE VIEWS OF THE LAKES AND THEIR
FIRST ORDER CONSEQUENCES
The following five views of the lakes and their first order
consequences have emerged in Canada and the United States
during the past three decades. The five views are seldom articu-
lated as such and much Great Lakes diversion discourse uses
many of them interchangeably. The Preamble to the latest
Annex 2001 standards melds many of the views. For example, it
recognizes that the lakes are "a shared public treasure, that
32. See infra Part III, for a more detailed discussion of the differences between
Canadian and United States federalism and how these differences might influence
the law that each country applies to the Great Lakes.
2006]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
management is essential to maintaining the integrity of the
Great Lakes Basin ecosystem," and that "[tlhe States and
provinces must balance economic and social development and
environmental protection as interdependent and mutually
reinforcing pillars of sustainable development."3 3
A. PERPETUAL GIFT
This categorization is an attempt to capture the emerging
Native American perspective, which takes the intrinsic value of
the lakes as a given cultural norm. Native Americans possess
littoral lands on the lakes in both Canada and the United
States. Tribes and bands were the first inhabitants of the
region but are late comers to the diversion debate because they
have no vested or potential conventional water rights in the
lakes themselves to protect. 34 But the riparian and nonriparian
tribes in the basin have long viewed the watershed as a
cherished, sustainable gift of fish and game.3 5 This view has not
been a major factor in Great Lakes debates. The reservations
and other Native American lands are not major consumptive
users; the impact of the prospective diversions on Native
American uses is highly speculative at best, and there have been
few modern disputes about off-reservation treaty fishing rights
in the lakes, 36 as opposed to the tributaries. However, tribes
have begun to object to tributary uses of waters and are in the
process of articulating a distinctive, intergenerational view of
the lakes, although the interests focus more on the right to have
their voice heard than on the substantive issues of the
conditions under which small diversions will be allowed.
The first assertion of Native American rights occurred in a
33. The Great Lakes Charter Annex, A Supplementary Agreement to the Great
Lakes Charter, June 18, 2001, available at http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/
GreatLakesCharterAnnex.pdf; Great Lakes Basin Sustainable Water Resources
Agreement, May 20, 2005.
34. Native American water rights are either asserted for a specific amount of
water to fulfill a reservation's purpose, usually irrigation, or to protect reserved
hunting and fishing rights. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397-99
(9th Cir. 1983).
35. Chief John Beaucage, Presentation of Grand Council of Union of Ontario
Indians at Munk Centre-Michigan State University: The Future of the Great Lakes
Basin for Students, Citizens, and Media (July 29, 2005).
36. See generally United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich.
1979); Lac Coutre Oreilles v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420 (W.D. Wis. 1987). For a
brief history of some of the reasons why the Chippewa people lost the ability to fish
in the lakes, see CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN
INDIAN NATIONS 153--57 (2005).
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challenge by three Michigan bands to the location of the Perrier
bottled water plant in Michigan. Perrier planned to pump 400
gallons per minute from a spring that eventually reaches two
tributaries of Lake Michigan. The bands opposed the proposed
diversion, arguing that it would interfere with their treaty
fishing rights. The Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality had issued a license, but the governor had not invoked
the charter process. Nonetheless, the bands claimed that the
extraction violated the anti-export prohibition in WRDA 2000.
However, after tracing the history of Great Lakes diversion
controversies from the Chicago diversion to Annex 2001, the
court dismissed the complaint because WRDA created no
private rights.37 United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
requires that persons claiming implied rights under federal
statutes designed to advance a general public interest demon-
strate that they fall within a specially benefited class, that
Congress intended implicitly or explicitly to create the right,
that the right is consistent with the statutory scheme, and that
a federal interest is at stake. 38 Applying this restrictive test,
the court held that riparians were not a specially benefited class
because any rights extend to the public generally, there was no
indication of congressional intent to create a private cause of
action, the right would be inconsistent with the statutory
scheme, which contemplates gubernatorial decision making, and
"tribal rights ... are fairly peripheral to the ... statute."39 This
decision will not be the last word on Native American claims to
the lakes and their tributaries.
B. WORLD HERITAGE ECOSYSTEM
The category of world heritage ecosystem could be
subdivided into two classifications, world heritage resource and
high-value ecosystem, but I have combined them because the
two concepts are often tightly linked. Many world heritage sites
are high-value ecosystems. As with the Native American/First
Nation view, the core of this classification is the idea that the
lakes constitute a nonrenewable, functioning system that should
be maintained in as close to its natural condition as possible for
37. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Great Springs Waters of
Am., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 853 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
38. E.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2000).
39. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
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the benefit of present and future generations. 40 The legal basis
for the claim is the emerging field of international environ-
mental law, which is in the process of adding a new category of
global commons to such traditional areas as the high seas and
upper atmosphere. 41 In brief, heritage resources are vulnerable
ecosystems of global significance such as rain forests and coral
reefs. The rationale is that the potential adverse global impacts
of ecosystem modification are so substantial that the inter-
national community has an interest in these resources.
However, in contrast to the Native American view, this view is
ultimately a utilitarian one because it protects the ecosystem
services of natural systems, which are the common heritage of
humankind. 42 However, the management and diversion stand-
ards are substantially the same.
The idea of common heritage commons originated in Article
136 of United Nations Law of the Sea, which came into force in
1994. Article 136 declares that deep sea beds are "the common
heritage of mankind."43  The concept has arguably been
extended to the Antarctic, which is the only continent not yet
divided among nation states. The Antarctic Treaty, which came
into force in 1961, freezes the territorial claims of the various
states, 44 and the 1991 Madrid Protocol on the Antarctic
Environment expressly imposes a number of stringent
assessment and protection duties on an activity that threatens
to damage the continent's ecosystems. 45  The idea of
extraterritorial duties toward areas of global concern is reflected
in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, which has been
affirmed in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
40. See Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, supra note 2
(recommending practices aimed at preservation of the Great Lakes Basin).
41. Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1485, 1534-36 (1991) distinguishes among three categories: (1) areas within a
single country or group of countries, such as a rain forest, that have global impacts,
(2) unallocated commons, and (3) true commons for which the assignment of
sovereign rights is impossible.
42. M. A. Fitzmaurice, International Protection of the Environment, in RECUEIL
DES COURSES: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 150-61 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2002); ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH
SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 31-37 (3d ed. 2004).
43. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 136, Dec. 10, 1982,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1293.
44. The Antarctic Treaty, art. IV, Dec. 1, 1959, 19 I.L.M. 860.
45. Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1461; see Francesco Francioni, The Madrid Protocol on the Protection of the
Antarctic Environment, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993).
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Environment and Development 46 and the 2002 Johannesburg
Summit-the ten-year follow up to the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.
Principle 21 qualifies the right to develop by the responsibility
not to "cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."47  The
international community still resists the extension of the
common heritage principle beyond traditionally recognized
common resources.48 For example, the Preamble to the 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity states only that biological
diversity is a "common concern of human kind,"49 and this
represents a rejection of stronger classifications of biodiversity
which might constrain national discretion. Nonetheless, the idea
of heritage or ecosystems of common concern continues to evolve
through state practice.
The ecosystem component of this view underscores the fact
that although the lakes contain large amounts of water, volumes
are needed to perform vital ecological and human services.
Thus, changes in the system, including large and small with-
drawals, should be viewed skeptically. First, for example, it
takes over one hundred years to flush pollutants through the
system.50 Second, the levels needed to sustain navigation and
the Chicago diversion are high, and a small drop in lake levels
could impact these services. Third, although global climate
change scenarios are not consistent, many suggest lowered
levels and thus reinforce the precautionary idea that the levels
of Lakes should be left to their natural fluctuating cycles. 51 The
46. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14,
1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, principle 2, U.N. Doc
AICONF.151/5JRev.1, 31 I.L.M. 874, 876 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
47. Id.
48. In 2005, the Brazilian Senate Foreign Relations and National Defense
Commission held a debate on the threats posed by the views of "the international
community" which perceive the Amazon rain forest as "collective public goods."
Fleet Admiral Miguel Angelo Davena announced that the military has prepared a
strategy of resistance should the region be threatened by a "superior power." Brazil
Marshalls Defenses to Fight Amazon Internationalization, ENV'T NEWS SERVICE,
Apr. 11, 2005, available at http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr2005/2005-04-11-
04.asp.
49. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 822 (1992).
50. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL U.S. & ROYAL Soc'y CAN., THE GREAT LAKES WATER
QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN EVOLVING INSTRUMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 2
(1985) [hereinafter NAT'L RES. COUNCIL].
51. Nine of ten climate models predict some lowering of lake levels. Climate
Change Impacts on the US: Great Lakes, Educational Resources,
http://www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/nacc/education/greatlakes/greatlakes-edu-3.htm (last
visited Sept. 24, 2005).
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approach is also an extension of decades-long efforts by the two
countries to improve the quality of the lakes. Canada and the
United States have adopted an ecosystem approach to guide
future pollution control strategies.5 2 In addition, as stated pre-
viously, Canadian and United States laws, supported by the
IJC, 53 make it very difficult to divert substantial quantities of
water from the lakes. The net result is that there is an
increasing recognition, particularly in Canada, 54 that the lakes
are a heritage resource.
Thus, the guiding principle should be the long-term
conservation of a functioning natural system, and this principle
should be implemented by regulators' use of the precautionary
principle to scrutinize significant alterations in the system. The
2000 IJC reference on diversions concluded, inter alia, that (1)
"[i]f all interests in the Basin are considered, there is never a
'surplus' of water in the Great Lakes system; every drop of
water has several potential uses, and trade-offs must be made
when, through human intervention, waters are removed from
the system," and (2) "[alny water taken from the system has to
be replaced to restore the system's lost resilience .... The
precautionary principle dictates that removals should not be
authorized unless it can be shown, with confidence, that they
will not adversely affect the integrity of the Great Lakes Basin
ecosystem."55
C. NATURAL RESOURCE
Canada and the United States developed through the
exploitation of the natural resources, such as timber, fisheries,
grazing lands, and minerals, with which the countries were
endowed.5 6 Both Canada and the United States have long
52. See NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 27-33; PERSPECTIVES ON
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR THE GREAT LAKES: A READER (Lynton K. Caldwell ed.
1988).
53. Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, supra note 2 (describing the
lakes as "a central feature of the natural and cultural heritage of the Great Lakes
region").
54. See ELIZABETH MAY, THE GREAT LAKES PRIMER: A CITIZEN'S PRIMER TO
PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES AND THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER (2005),
http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/great-lakes/great-lakes-primer.pdf.
55. Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, supra note 2.
56. RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 136 (Yale University
Press 1999) (noting that in the 19th century, "[t]he dominant environmental policies
were to encourage the conversion of the continent's environmental assets into
economic commodities.").
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viewed the lakes as a resource to be used for human benefit and
have tried to ensure that they are open to multiple uses.57
Fortunately for the future of the lakes, the uses have been
primarily for non-consumptive navigation, but the long tradition
of human use has led to a widespread perception among many
in the user community that the lakes are an exploitable, free
resource. 58 The natural resource view differs from the perpetual
gift and world heritage views. All consumptive and non-
consumptive uses are equal since human benefit is the under-
lying norm. Followers of this view seek primarily to develop
procedures and standards to decide the conditions under which
the use should take place.
D. COMMODITY
The commodity view of the lakes sees them as a natural
resource to be exploited for human benefit, but compared to the
traditional view of the lakes as a multiple-use resource, this
view seeks a regime that encourages consumptive use. This view
is best articulated in the 1999 Lockhead opinion prepared for
the Council of Great Lakes governors.5 9 The opinion argued
that the U.S. federal legislation approving state laws that
prohibit interbasin transfers is unconstitutional. The opinion
also argued that state export prohibitions violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause and that the federal legislation was an
insufficient exercise of Congress's power to waive the Dormant
Commerce Clause. 60
One of the recurring issues in Great Lakes diversion
politics, and one addressed by the Lockhead opinion, is the effect,
57. Nature is a contested human construct. Basically, the modern contest is
between nature as a Garden of Eden versus nature as storehouse of commodities to
be used for human betterment. See UNCOMMON GROUND: TOWARD REINVENTING
NATURE 34-52 (William Cronon ed., 1995).
58. See LOCKHEAD, supra note 26. The report recommended that the Great
Lakes states and provinces adopt a diversion standard to avoid a court holding that
the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, infra note 74, was an
unconstitutional delegation of power. The report suggested that the states and
provinces adopt a "resource improvement" standard which would allow ecosystem
restoration to compensate for the potential adverse impacts of a .withdrawal. For
the response of Canadian environmentalists, see ELIZABETH MAY, supra note 54.
Industrial users also objected to having to pay for the use of the lakes which have
historically been open access commons. The standard was dropped without a word
of explanation in the July, 2005 Annex 2001 Draft.
59. See LOCKEAD, supra note 26.
60. See generally New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331
(1982) (holding that Congress may expressly waive the Dormant Commerce Clause).
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of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1981 Sporhase decision, which held
that water was an article of commerce and that state export
bans were unconstitutional discriminatory legislation unless the
state had a strong conservation rationale for the ban.61 Justice
Stevens' majority opinion indicated that a "demonstrably arid
State" may possibly make out a conservation defense. 62 Since
the Great Lakes Basin is a humid one, this standard could never
be met. To solve the problems posed by Sporhase and the non-
delegation doctrine, the opinion further argued that the Great
Lakes states should follow the model of the western states and
adopt an interstate water allocation compact. The compact
would quantify the states' respective shares of Great Lakes
water to which the states are entitled under the doctrine of
equitable apportionment. Each state would then be free to use
its share. Others have gone further and proposed a cap and
trade scheme. 63 Each state would be given a definite amount of
water to be allocated as each chooses between in- and out-of-
basin uses.
To date, the Great Lakes have moved in the opposite
direction toward the heritage-constrained resource end of the
spectrum, but the commodity view continues to excite fears that
a transcendent legal regime such as the U.S. Constitution or
international trade law will preempt state and provincial control
by "commodifying" the lakes.64 This fear seems the most plaus-
ible rationale for the decision of the Governor of Michigan to
order state officials to block a proposal by Nestle to withdraw
spring water for bottled water sales unless Nestle could prove
that the bottles would be sold exclusively within the basin.65
This protectionism has no basis in water law or in any of the
five views of the lakes.66
61. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
62. Id. at 958.
63. Mark Squillace, Univ. of Toledo, Address at Legal Diversions or Legal
Solutions: The Draft Annex 2001 Agreements and the Future of the Great Lakes
Basin, jointly sponsored by the Chicago-Kent College of Law and the Munk Centre
for International Studies at Trinity College, University of Toronto (Feb. 17, 2005).
64. See Christine Elwell, NAFTA Effects on Water: Testing for NAFTA Effects
in the Great Lakes Basin, 3 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L. SCI. & POL'Y 151 (2001);
Sanford E. Gaines, Fresh Water: Environment or Trade?, 28 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 157
(2002); and Cynthia Bauman, Water Wars: Canada's Upstream Battle to Ban Bulk
Water Exports, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 109 (2001).
65. Luke, supra note 22.
66. This anti-commodity argument was made in Michigan Citizens for Water
Conservation v. Nestle Waters N. Am., Inc., Case No. 01-14563-CE (Mich. 49th
Judicial Cir. 2003), available at http://www.envlaw.comldecisions/
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E. CONSTRAINED NATURAL RESOURCE
The process initiated by the Great Lakes Charter has led to
a synthesized view of the lakes. In the past two decades, the
eight Great Lakes states have come to view the lakes as a
constrained natural resource. This view is premised on the
assumption that consumptive and non-consumptive uses are
legitimate but that the former should be carefully assessed and
conditioned to minimize interference with the ecosystem. Under
this view, diversions should be limited in quantity and geo-
graphical scope and the precautionary principle followed.67 This
approach recognizes that the lakes have long been used and
must be used in the future to sustain Canada's major population
concentration and a major region of the United States. Thus,
limited tradeoffs between environmental and human use values
are permitted to a greater extent than they would be under the
gift and heritage views. The difference between the resource
and constrained resource view is the range of tradeoffs are much
narrower under the latter. The different views are at the heart
of the debate about Annex 2001. To the dismay of Canadian
nationalists such as the Council of Canadians, no Annex 2002
draft excludes all consumptive uses. The drafts have pro-
gressively limited the range of permitted transbasin diversions
and increased the standards and review of intrabasin with-
drawals.
The June 2005 draft of the Great Lakes Basin Water
Resources Compact,68 which Congress must approve, divides
MCWC%20decision.pdf. The reasonable use rule of groundwater limits use to
overlying land and the opponents of the plan argued that when groundwater was
used to produce commodities, the commodities could only be consumed on the
overlying land. The trial court rejected the argument.
67. The precautionary principle posits that a high degree of certainty about the
adverse impacts of an activity is not a necessary prerequisite to limit or regulate it
and is one of the foundations of international environmental law. See, e.g., 1992 Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, June 3-24, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/26/Rev. 1 (August 12,
1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) (endorsing the precautionary principle). The
principle remains much contested. See Christopher D. Stone, Is There a
Precautionary Principle?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10790, 10792 (2001) (arguing the
principle is incoherent and unfair); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the
Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996) (advancing a similar
argument). Crucial issues such as who bears the burden of proof and how feedback
loops should operate remain unresolved, but properly used, it is an essential
principle of modern ecosystem management.
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withdrawals into four major categories. New and increased
diversions-which are defined as transfer of water outside the
Great Lakes Basin or between the watersheds of one lake to
another-are prohibited subject to limited exceptions. 69 New or
increased intrabasin withdrawals of 100,000 gallons per day or
greater over a ninety-day period are regulated only by the juris-
diction in which they originate. 70 Withdrawals for intrabasin
use between 100,000 and 5,000,000 gallons over a ninety-day
period must meet stringent standards such as certain return
flow requirements and a showing that there is no reasonable
available alternative water supply. 71  Withdrawals over
5,000,000 gallons over a ninety-day period must meet the same
standards and are subject to regional review. 72  The only
interbasin transfers allowed are those for cities or counties that
straddle the basin. One of the major political issues in the
current diversion debate is the question of whether small, trans-
basin diversions should be allowed in areas where the basin
boundary extends only a few miles inland or where there is a
difference between the surface and groundwater boundary, and
if so, under what conditions.73 Originally, the governments of
the eight basin states thought that such diversions should be
allowed and under conditions that included a "resource improve-
ment" standard. On the whole, the two Canadian provinces and
the federal government of Canada thought the answer was that
there should be a diversion only if there was a "no net loss"
standard. This gap was considerably narrowed when the
Council of Great Lakes governors withdrew a previous draft
which included a resource improvement standard and issued a
new one that omitted it. 74
69. Id. art. IV, § 4.6.
70. Id. art. IV, § 4.8.
71. Id art. V, §§ 4.7(2)(b)(ii)-(iii).
72. Id. art. IV, §§ 4.7(2)(c)(i)-(iii).
73. The current focus is on rapidly growing Waukesha County, Wisconsin. The
county lies just outside the Great Lakes watershed, although there is some evidence
that the area's groundwater pumping has reversed the flow of the aquifer and may
actually be drawing water that would otherwise reach Lake Michigan. See Dan
Egan, Water Pressures Divide a Great Lakes State, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
November 23, 2003, at 1A; Felicity Barringer, Growth Stirs New Water Battle, for
Great Lakes, N.Y. TIMES, August 12, 2005, at A12.
74. The 2000 amendment to the 1986 Water Resources Development Act
required the states to develop a standard that included "resource improvement." 42
U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b)(2) (2000). A great deal of money was expended between 2000
and 2005 to determine how the standard could be made operational, and a number
of students of Great Lakes policy were surprised to see the standard dropped
without explanation. Email from Henry Henderson, Principal, Policy Solutions, Inc.
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III. CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES FEDERALISM
The commitment to negotiate a binding mechanism to
regulate Great Lakes diversions that applies to both the Great
Lakes states and Canadian provinces is a legal as well as
political challenge. The two countries have different views of
the lakes for a variety of reasons. Environmental nationalism is
strong in Canada and opposition to any diversion resonates
more with Canadians than it does with Americans. Further, the
practice of federalism in the two countries plays an important
role. In brief, the U.S. government is much more willing to
defer to the states as long as the Boundary Waters Treaty is not
compromised, but the Canadian government views the lakes as
a foreign affairs issue and thus the exclusive province of the
federal government and the IJC.
Canada is usually described as having a weak federal gov-
ernment compared to the United States.75 This norm applies
differently to Great Lakes issues, however. The Canadian
government has asserted the exclusive power to legislate on
Great Lakes issues because of the Boundary Treaty Act of
1909.76 In contrast, despite the U.S. government's plenary
power, the states have both greater discretion to select the use
and management objectives for the lakes and to obtain federal
validation for their choices. The issue is important because the
eight basin states cooperate closely with Canadian provinces
and would like to include them in an interstate compact.
Congress and the executive branch have elected not to
assert the full reach of the commerce power and thus have
allowed the states great discretion to control the Great Lakes
diversion agenda themselves, subject to federal approval.77 The
Great Lakes are international navigable waters78 and thus the
federal government could assert full plenary power over them
under the Commerce Clause or the treaty power. To date, the
federal government has chosen to share its authority with the
states. For example, after the Lockhead opinion, the basin
to A. Dan Tarlock, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law (July 26, 2005) (on
file with author).
75. See Patrick Monahan, Canada's Federalism and Its Impact on Cross-Border
Trade, 17 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 19 (2001).
76. See the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 30.
77. See Three Year Review, supra note 3, at 27.
78. See Sharon A. Williams, Public International Law and Water Quality
Management in a Common Drainage Basin: The Great Lakes, 18 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 155 (1986).
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states succeeded in obtaining new federal legislation. Section
504 of the WRDA 2000 directs the states, in cooperation with
the two Canadian basin provinces, "to develop and implement a
mechanism that provides a common conservation standard
embodying the principles of water conservation and resource
improvement for making decisions concerning the withdrawal
and use of water from the Great Lakes Basin."79 WRDA stan-
dards reflect in part the position of Governor Engler of Michigan
in voting for a straddling community diversion in Indiana.8 0
The highest level of interstate cooperation is an interstate
compact, into which the states can enter. Article I, Section 10,
Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides, "[n]o state shall,
without the Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement
or compact without another state, or with a foreign Power ....
The Compact Clause has been interpreted to allow states to
enter into binding agreements to define or share their quasi-
sovereign powers. In the twentieth century, a number of states
entered into compacts to define their inchoate equitable shares
of interstate rivers. An interstate compact is a federally-
approved binding agreement among the states. Once approved,
the compact becomes federal law and federal common law
applies.81
The language of the Compact Clause also permits compacts
with foreign powers. Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 draws a
distinction between compacts and treaties. The latter are
reserved exclusively to the federal government, but the former
are not. No general international rule exists to prohibit a subor-
dinate or member unit of a federal system from entering into
formal relations with other nations or the subordinate units of
those nations.8 2 The scope of state power remains undefined.
Some commentators have argued that the Compact Clause is
limited to agreements among the U.S. states. However,
Professor Lawrence Tribe argues that the clause encompasses
other agreements and suggests only two limitations.8 3 Any
state-provincial agreement must not interfere with the
President's exclusive foreign affairs power or be inconsistent
with existing treaties. It is unlikely that Congress would
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b), as amended (2000).
80. See Three Year Review, supra note 3, at 27, n.39.
81. Texas v. New Mexico, 446 U.S. 540 (1980).
82. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 366 (1995).
83. 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 650 n.37 (Foundation Press, 3rd ed.
2000).
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consent to a state-provincial compact that was inconsistent with
either Canada's or the United States' interpretation of the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
Canada, on the other hand, views Great Lakes diversions as
a federal matter. In 2001, it amended its Boundary Treaty Act.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs may issue a license for a person
to "use, obstruct or divert boundary waters, either temporarily
or permanently, in a manner that affects, or is likely to affect, in
any way the natural level or flow of the boundary waters on the
other side of the international boundary" subject to exceptions
that are made for "the ordinary use of waters for domestic or
sanitary purposes, or the exceptions specified in the regu-
lations."8 4 Section 11 clearly reflects Canada's obligations under
Article III of the Boundary Waters Treaty. Section 13 provides
that, notwithstanding section 11, "no person shall use or divert
boundary waters by removing water from the boundary waters
and taking it outside the water basin in which the boundary
waters are located."8 5  Moreover, section 13 also includes a
deemer provision which states that any such removal "is
deemed, given the cumulative effect of removals ... to affect the
natural level or flow of the boundary waters on the other side of
the international boundary."86
CONCLUSION
The evolving law of the Great Lakes recognizes that they
are North America's great fresh water reserve, which support a
wide range of non-consumptive and consumptive uses, and a
functioning ecosystem which provides a wide range of services.
However, the amount of fresh water makes them a prime
candidate, at least in the eyes of many in Canada and the
United States, for transbasin diversions to augment supplies in
water-deprived areas. Global climate change helps fuel the
persistent regional fear that the lakes will be tapped to augment
water supplies outside the basin, although the lakes are less
vulnerable to the projected effects of global climate change than
small bodies of water in arid regions.8 7 There is an emerging




87. See Stanley Changnon, Understanding The Physical Setting: The Great
Lakes Climate and Lake Level Functions, in LAKE MICHIGAN DIVERSION AT CHICAGO
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consensus within the basin that the lakes should be conserved
by maintaining their natural, fluctuating levels and by
minimizing diversions. The question is how to incorporate these
views into legal standards.
Many environmentalists are upset that the current Annex
2001 drafts do not affirm that the waters of the Great Lakes are
subject to the public trust, as did initial drafts.88 On one level a
reference is unnecessary. The law is clear: all Great Lakes
states hold the beds of navigable waters in trust for the people.89
The public trust notion is much loved because it is both a source
of public rights and a potential constraint on the states' power to
allow exploitation of trust resources. A late nineteenth-century
U.S. Supreme Court case invalidated a legislative grant of a
large portion of the Chicago lakefront as inconsistent with the
state's duty to devote trust resources to the public benefit.90 In
the much noted Mono Lake case, National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court of Alpine County,9 1 the California Supreme
Court held that the public trust extends to environmental
values and applies to vested water rights. The case also held
that environmental protection must be accommodated by the
protection of trust resources even for public benefit, in this case
the water supply of Los Angeles. The public trust doctrine
should be understood to be a background principle which
reinforces the regulatory efforts to limit Lake uses to non-
consumptive uses except when consumptive uses do not impair
the integrity of the Great Lakes ecosystem. It is not a strict
doctrine that mandates ecosystem conservation to the exclusion
of all other uses. While the doctrine is a source of state
legislative authority to prefer non-consumptive over consump-
tive uses, it is not a talisman. In the end, the public trust is
shorthand for a state's reserved sovereign power to manage its
AND URBAN DRAUGHT: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE REGIONAL IMPACTS AND
RESPONSES TO GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 39 (Stanley Changnon ed., 1994). The IJC
recently reviewed the models and concluded that they suggest that "some lowering
of water levels is likely to occur." Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes, supra
note 2.
88. Andy Guy, Whose Water is it Anyway? Critics Say Great Lakes Proposal
Retreats on Public Trust, Industry Responsibilities, GREAT LAKES BULL. SERV., Aug.
5, 2005.
89. E.g., People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1973);
Obrecht v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 105 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. 1960); State v. Slotness, 185
N.W.2d 530 (Minn. 1971); Lake Sand Co. v. State ex rel. Attorney General, 120 N.E.
714 (Ind. App. 1918).
90. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
91. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
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waters. 92 All five views of the lakes have been found to be
consistent with the public trust at various times in various
states.93
To ensure a sustainable future for the lakes, states and
provinces must strike a balance among the five views. The
public trust doctrine reminds the states that they must
approach use and management of the lakes with humility. In
addition, the states need to improve their domestic legislation to
address under-regulated problems such as groundwater
extraction and the environmental impacts of surface and
groundwater withdrawals. Ultimately, however, the lakes can
only be sustained by diversion standards that impose strict
limitations on consumptive uses of the lakes. These standards
must be imposed by institutions that will ensure that they will
be applied consistently and will be based on the continuous
assembly and synthesis of relevant scientific information.
92. Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45
CAL. L. REV. 638 (1957).
93. A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §§ 8.22-8.25
(1988 & Supp. 2005).
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